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Abstract
On both sides of the Atlantic the regulation of gas transmission networks has
undergone major changes since the early 1990’s. Whereas in the US the long-
standing regime of rate-of-return regulation was complemented by increasing 
pipe-to-pipe competition most European countries moved towards incentive 
regulation and the European Commission has been eager to integrate national 
markets.
This paper studies the impact of the US regulatory reforms using a Malmquist 
based productivity analysis for a panel of US companies over the period 1996-
2004. Results are presented for changes in productivity, its constituent parts as 
well as several convergence tests. When taking productivity change as an 
indicator, US regulation has been rather successful. Though there are 
differences between various models as well as between technical change and 
efficiency change overall productivity change is positive during a period 
where overall demand is flat.
The lessons for European regulators are twofold. First, the US analysis shows 
what sort of benchmarking of European gas transmission utilities is possible if 
European data were available on a comparable basis (which it currently is 
not). Second, the performance of the competitive US gas pipeline industry 
provides a benchmark for European productivity performance under incentive 
regulation.
Keywords: Gas transmission; regulation; total factor productivity; European 
energy market reform
JEL classification: L51, L95, O57, D24
1. Introduction
This paper measures efficiency and productivity for regulated US inter-state gas 
transmission pipelines.1 The objective is twofold. First, we want to show how the 
performance of US gas transmission pipelines developed and what this might imply for 
the effectiveness of regulation. Second, this exercise as well as the wider US 
experience, offers interesting insights for European regulators, and in particular for 
regulators that implement benchmark-based incentive regulation.
The challenge for any regulator is to increase efficiency and reduce prices, as stated by 
the European Commission in the second Gas Directive from 2003 (“Acceleration 
Directive”). Though the process of European gas market liberalization and integration 
commenced in the mid 1990’s the Commission acknowledges in its Acceleration 
Directive and its recent Sector Inquiry2 that many obstacles remain.
In this paper we argue that European regulators can benefit from looking across the 
Atlantic to learn from US experience, including the empirical analysis of US data. Even 
though the European Commission in its Sector Inquiry acknowledges that the US gas 
market is much more developed then European gas markets (possibly with the 
exception of the UK), little effort seems to have been paid to date by European 
regulators to learn from the US.3 Also, not much attention has been paid by academia. 
One exception is a very insightful comparison of the regulatory institutions by 
Makholm (2007).
                                               
1 The authors would like to thank the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for supporting 
this study.
2 European Commission (2007).
3 A  recent exception  is a report we submitted to the Council of European Energy Regulators that
benchmarks several European gas transmission operators against US inter-state gas transmission 
companies [see Jamasb et al. (2007)]. Also, the German network regulator discusses the incentive 
regulation for gas distribution in Massachusetts and commissioned a report to learn about non-European 
regulation including the US [see Bundesnetzagentur (2006b)].
2Though there are important differences between European and US gas markets and their 
regulation we believe that looking at the US is a worthwhile exercise for several
reasons. First, regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have the same objectives and face 
similar obstacles. Second, the large US internal market and the public availability of 
data on regulated entities provide a fertile ground for the empirical analysis that is the 
focus of this paper.4 And, most importantly, the mature US industry with its long history 
of regulation and important regulatory changes over the last two decades offers itself a 
“benchmark” for the two major challenges facing European regulators: market 
integration and regulatory reform. Recent regulatory reform in the US moved the gas 
transportation market from a natural monopoly to a network oligopoly and shifted the 
regulatory focus from pipelines to markets as argued by O'Neill et al. (1996). This 
evolution is discussed in more detail below.
At a practical level, the lack of high-quality, standardized data in Europe poses a 
challenge for the implementation of benchmarking-based incentive regulation. 
Comparisons with US firms may allow European regulators to produce robust 
benchmarks. To illustrate this point imagine a single national European regulator had to 
devise an incentive plan for four companies, which is too few to employ any 
benchmarking technique. Including data from other European countries might not be a 
short-run solution as data is not standardized across Europe. When using US data the 
regulator has to standardize only once and immediately can draw on enough data for a 
robust empirical analysis.
In our analysis we use efficiency scores and Malmquist productivity indices to shed
light on the following questions. How did productivity of US inter-state gas 
transmission companies develop between 1996 and 2004? Is there convergence in 
performance?  What does this imply for the effectiveness of US regulation? Finally, 
how can this analysis help European regulators to implement and assess incentive 
regulation?
                                               
4 The often stunning differences in transparency between the US and Europe are discussed by Makholm 
(2007). The US approach on transparency is discussed by Olsen (2005).
3The productivity of US gas transmission pipelines has already been explored in the 
literature using firm-level data for earlier periods. Aivazian (1987) measures 
productivity growth of the US gas transmission industry as well as its constituent parts 
(for labour productivity) including scale efficiency. The main finding is that the 
contribution of technical change is at least as large as the contribution of scale 
economies. There is also a literature on the effect of regulatory change on US 
transmission companies. Examples are Sickles and Streitwieser (1991), Sickles and 
Streitwieser (1998), and Granderson (2000). Together these papers show that technical 
efficiency fell after well-head price deregulation in 1978 due to increasing prices and 
falling consumption [Sickles and Streitwieser (1991)] and that the regulatory change 
leading to third-party access in the mid 1980’s lead to small cost reductions 
[Granderson (2000)]. Moreover, up to the early 1990’s efficiency scores are diverging 
[Granderson (2000)]. Given that our sample (1996-2004) starts several years after the 
latest regulatory push for more access and more competition in 1992 we expect to 
observe increasing efficiency and possibly convergence.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the background and in particular 
describes the development of the US market and regulation. Section 3 outlines the 
methodology. Section 4 introduces the variables and Section 5 the data. Section  6
presents the results. Section 7 discusses the results and concludes.
2. Background
Beginning with the deregulation of wellhead prices in 1978 the US natural gas market 
and its regulation changed dramatically. The market evolved from being vertically 
integrated and highly regulated to an unbundled, nationally integrated and increasingly 
lightly regulated market. Though there are many parallels with current efforts in Europe 
to unbundle, allow third-party access and integrate regional markets one difference is of 
4particular importance here. Whereas most European regulators move to incentive 
regulation for the unbundled pipeline bits of the value-chain, the US regulator aims at 
competition through interconnection and secondary capacity markets.
Already in 1987 about one third of city gate markets received services from multiple 
pipelines according to Kalt and Schuller (1987) as cited by Ellig (1993).  Doane et al. 
(2004) argue that regulatory change led to both an integrated US market for gas, a 
competitive wholesale market, and competition among, often “virtual”, pipelines.5
Unlike Europe, the United States today has a common market for gas with a single 
federal regulator for all inter-state commerce (FERC). Tariff setting though still 
dominated by “original cost-of-service regulation” [O'Neill et al. (1996)] is increasingly 
complemented by indexing and negotiated rate-setting. Inter-state companies are rate-
of-return regulated where FERC sets the maximum and minimum transportation rates. 
Actual rates are negotiated by the parties involved according to Granderson (2000).
Hirschhausen (2006) summarizes US regulation as follows:
"Contrary to Europe, where pipeline companies have a high degree of 
market power, the pipeline business in the US is competitive in many of the 
regions. Most destination markets are served by several competing 
pipelines. Thus, pipelines compete for shippers, and rates are negotiated in
a competitive environment. On the other hand, there remains a formal cost-
of-service regulation of interstate pipelines.”
Thus, whereas European regulators aim at incentive regulation for monopolies FERC 
aims at complementing traditional rate-of-return regulation with competition through 
encouraging (or mandating) the development of the necessary market institutions. 
However, on both sides of the Atlantic regulators have the same objective: increasing 
                                               
5 The observation that there is pipe-to-pipe competition obviously runs counter to the natural monopoly 
argument. Here we do not argue the case for or against natural monopoly as done for instance by Ellig 
(1993), Aivazian (1987) or Hirschhausen et al. (2007) but simply take the observation from the literature 
that there is nascent competition.
5efficiency6 and passing on any resulting gains to consumers.7 In the spirit of Shleifer 
(1985) both approaches should provide identical incentives for (static) efficiency 
increases.
As Figure 1 shows regulatory change was accompanied by a large expansion in 
consumption which might be a first indication of the success of the overall regulatory 
change in the US. However, our sample period is characterized by fluctuating and 
slightly downward trending consumption as well as increasing prices.
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Figure 1: US Gas Consumption and Prices
Besides differences in regulation between the US and the EU there are also differences 
in industry structure. Table 1 provides an “ad hoc” comparison of the two industries.8
                                               
6 Alger and Toman (1990) report on auction experiments commissioned by FERC that investigated the 
effect of increasing competition and different ways to implement it. An important result from these 
experiments is that the introduction of small amounts of competition (i.e. adding alternative routes or 
more competitors on the same route) can lead to a much improved performance of a stylized network.
7 Even without competitive pressures the regulatory lag might be sufficient to introduce incentives for 
cost reduction as argued by Sickles and Streitwieser (1998) and Schmidt (2000).
8 We assume 1bcf/d = 28.33 mcm/d. Because of the different sources the various numbers for Europe are 
not necessarily for the same sample of pipelines.
6We observe the following. The total number of companies is rather similar, measured 
by the physical characteristics US companies are bigger, and the US network has more 
interconnection points. As to the last observation one should note that Europe does not 
fare worse on the relation of interconnection points to total length of pipelines, however. 
Table 1: US-Europe Comparison of Industry Structure
US Europe (EU-25)
Number of 
companies
85 inter-state [Energy 
Information Agency 
(2002)], 39 inter-state (our 
sample)
40 national, 38 regional 
[European Commission 
(2005)]
Length of pipeline 
(miles)
212.000
Mean: 2494
St. Dev.: 3775
[Energy Information 
Agency (2002)]
18.542
Mean: 515
St. Dev.: 608
[Makholm (2007)]
Capacity 133 bcf/d
57.3 bcf/d  [European 
Commission (2007)]
Interconnection 
points
3089
Hubs: 14
[Energy Information 
Agency (2003)]
79 [GTE website]10
Hubs: 13 (however, almost all 
trading on only 6)
[European Commission 
(2007)]
Another important point is the difference in size as measured by length of pipelines. 
Though the US mean is several times larger then the European mean the European 
mean is twice the minimum of our sample as shown in Table 5 below.
                                               
9 Counted as the number of pipeline interconnections at hubs and market centres.
10 GIE system map at: http://gie.waxinteractive3.com/download/gridmap/GTE_OP_150.pdf
73. Methodology
First, we perform an econometric analysis to test our three candidate outputs or cost 
drivers. The use of econometrics to determine the relevance of variables prior to 
employing non-parametric techniques is common practice [see for instance Carrington 
(2002)]. We discuss the choice of variables in the next section. As we test positive for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in our panel we use Generalized Least Squares 
estimation. We also use log-likelihood tests to compare different models and test the 
significance of delivery volume as a cost-driver.11
Next, the empirical analysis of firm-level efficiency and productivity relies on non-
parametric frontier benchmarking techniques. Levels of technical efficiency in a given 
period are measured using Data Envelopment Analysis or DEA. Changes in total factor 
productivity (TFPC), technical efficiency (TEC) and technology (TC) between two 
periods are measured using the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) and its 
decomposition. The MPI is based on DEA.
The advantage of MPI is that unlike other index number approaches it allows to 
distinguish between technical change and efficiency change. The DEA based 
implementation was chosen because in a regulated environment it is not clear whether 
firms are cost minimizing. 
DEA is based on a piece-wise linear frontier that envelops the data. Unlike parametric 
techniques it does not account for measurement error, but does not run the risk of 
introducing specification error as no functional form is required for the frontier’s 
construction. Once the frontier is constructed efficiency scores for individual 
observation are based on the distances to the frontier.
                                               
11 All our regressions are performed in Stata. To test for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity we use the 
xtserial and xttest3 commands respectively. For the GLS estimation we use the xtgls command and for the 
log-likelihood test the lrtest command.
8One way to account for changes in productivity is to combine single and mixed-period 
distance functions into an index as pioneered by Caves et al. (1982) and Färe et al. 
(1989). Next, we present the methodology formally following Grosskopf (1993).
At each time period t = 1,..,T there are k = 1,…,K firms (i.e. decision units) that use a 
single input xk,t = (Xk) to produce n outputs y
k,t = (Y1k,…,Ynk). For each time period a 
production technology is constructed using DEA following Farrell (1957) and Charnes 
et al. (1978). For a given period t the constant returns to scale (CRS) frontier technology 
is given by:
where the upper boundary of this set represents the best practice frontier. Relative to 
this frontier technology St one may define an input distance function for company k:
Often regulators or regulated firms take issue with the CRS assumption. However, as 
the Malmquist indices allow for different returns to scale across periods this assumption 
is not very strong. A more detailed argument is provided by Grosskopf (1993).
Following Färe et al. (1989) and given two time periods (and thus two technologies) 
four input distance functions can be calculated where two evaluate a period’s 
observations against its respective reference technological and two evaluate its 
observations against the technology of the other period. The MPI is the geometric mean 
of these four distance functions
9As mentioned above an important feature of the Färe et al. (1989) version of the 
Malmquist index is that it can be decomposed, namely into
and
and thus
Noting that the input distance function is the reciprocal of the Farrell (1957) input-
oriented measure of technical efficiency we calculate the distance function for period t
as
10
Further details and the equivalent formulae for the mixed-period distance functions are 
given in Grosskopf (1993). The Malmquist index and its decomposition are illustrated 
in Figure 2. The two lines from the origin give the technological frontiers in the two 
periods. For both periods their respective observations lie somewhat below the frontier.
Figure 2: Illustration of a Malmquist Decomposition
11
Technical efficiency change is given as
and technical change as
and hence total factor productivity change as
Note that our Malmquist index is cumulative which means that we use the first year in 
our sample, 1996, as the base year for all indices. For instance, the index for 2001 is 
based on the observations for 1996 and 2001. An alternative would be to use an 
incremental index with changing base years where the two periods are always adjacent. 
We opted for the cumulative index because for our relatively short time series it 
provides a smoother path. To rule out the possibility that 1996 is somehow an odd year 
we also calculated cumulative indices based on 1997 (and dropping 1996). There does 
not seem to be any systematic difference between the results.
Once we have constructed the technical efficiency scores and the productivity indices 
we use these to analyze convergence. Following Alam and Sickles (2000) we borrow 
our convergence concepts from the macroeconomic growth literature which has 
established two convergence measures, often referred to as β-convergence and σ-
convergence. β-convergence is the notion that companies that start from a lower basis 
grow faster, where β refers the slope coefficient. σ-convergence assumes that changes in 
12
the moments of the distribution over time indicate convergence and σ stands for the 
variance. We perform a total of three convergence tests. First, we graphically relate the 
level of technical efficiency in the base year (i.e. the DEA score) to our Malmquist 
based measure of technical efficiency change. Second, following Alam and Sickles 
(2000) we regress the average year to year growth in the technical efficiency scores (i.e. 
the DEA score) on the logarithm of the technical efficiency scores in the base year (i.e. 
the DEA score). For both these β-convergence tests a negative relationship would 
indicate convergence. Last, we analyze σ-convergence following Färe et al. (2006) and 
produce the kernel density for the technical efficiency change indices by year. 
According to Färe et al. (2006) a kernel distribution is essentially a smoothed histogram. 
Thus, a narrowing of the distribution or a decrease in the variance is an indication of 
convergence.
4. Variable selection
Though, the technology of gas transportation is not necessarily complex from an 
engineering perspective variable selection from an economic and from a regulatory 
perspective is not obvious as different choices produce different results and therefore 
have different incentive properties. This is also the reason why we do not advocate a 
“preferred” model but rather outline how different models might be advantageous in 
different contexts. Our regulatory perspective also determines how we choose our 
variables. Mainly, our choice is informed by the actual regulatory framework, the 
literature and our discussions with regulators (see footnote 3). Admittedly, our approach 
is rather “ad hoc” in the sense that we do not test alternative cost-drivers but rather 
verify the econometric significance of our variables.
As mentioned above we use an input-output model that for the purpose of our 
optimization is input oriented and therefore treats the “right-hand side” of our cost 
13
model as output and cost as input. To summarize, our inputs are alternatively total cost
(Totex) or revenue and our outputs are total length of mains, total compressor station 
horsepower rating and total yearly delivery volume. The latter is excluded from some 
models. We now discuss these variables one at a time.
First, we turn to outputs or cost-drivers. Much of the literature uses production functions 
where the prime output is gas delivered and inputs are capital and labour. Callen (1978), 
for instance, uses an engineering Cobb-Douglas function where delivery is a function of 
horsepower and line-pipe capacity and a scale factor. Line-pipe capacity is measured in 
tons of steel which is a function of length, diameter, and an assumption on wall 
thickness. Aivazian (1987) and Sickles and Streitwieser (1991) use economic 
production functions. They use delivery volumes weighted by transport distances as 
output. Alternatively, Granderson (2000) uses compressor fuel as a proxy for output.
Construction cost drivers identified by the International Energy Agency (1994) are: 
length of pipeline, maximum flow required for a day of peak demand, the trade-off 
between diameter and compressor power rating, as well as the terrain and right of way. 
We exclude all exogenous factors as well as right of way. As we have no measure of 
diameter we only use total horsepower rating and length of mains as outputs 
representing capacity or capital.12 The importance of horsepower is that it allows 
increasing capacity on a given line. Aivazian and Callen (1981) state that:
 “[…] the line-pipe may take months or years to construct and is clearly the 
most inflexible input. However, once the line-pipe is in the ground, 
horsepower capacity may be added fairly continuously to the line to build 
up capacity.”
Note that the exclusion of other capacity measures might affect comparability. 
According to the International Energy Agency (1994) the “peak problem” might be 
solved differently in different countries and at different times as well as by different 
                                               
12 As shown by International Energy Agency (1994, Fig. 2) there is a clear relationship between pipeline 
diameter and compressor power for a given transport volume per year.
14
firms. Spare capacity, storage and demand response can all address the issue but might 
be of different importance under different regulatory regimes and for different 
companies. For instance, as we do not account for storage, its strategic use as addressed 
by O'Neill (2005) does not infer an advantage. A company that uses storage more cost 
effectively then others use horsepower and mains will be disadvantaged. Next, we 
discuss delivery which we alternatively include or exclude.
A reason for the exclusion of delivery is that most costs are fixed. Even most O&M 
costs (except compressor fuel and compressor maintenance) are fixed as stated by the  
International Energy Agency (1994, p. 48).13 Second, as pipelines moved from selling a 
bundle of transportation services and gas to selling transportation services only, also 
revenue is less and less driven by delivery.
However, there are reasons for including delivery. Our econometric testing does not 
unambiguously reject delivery as a cost driver. Revenue is still delivery driven.14
Increased competition and therefore increasingly diverging business models also imply 
different approaches to increase capacity and possible delivery in ways that we do not 
account for (e.g. better systems). Assuming a company uses better management or 
trading to increase delivery with given capacity, a model excluding delivery would not 
account for this. Less innovative companies would be rewarded. Generally, it might be 
possible that the pipeline does not increase delivery even though this would increase
welfare because the pipeline is bound by the incentives of the particular benchmarking 
model.
Including delivery causes a technical problem related our use of Malmquist indices and 
the fact that delivery shows a rather high year-to-year variability. Coelli et al. (2005, p. 
306) and Nghiem and Coelli (2002) explain why variables that fluctuate on a year-to-
                                               
13 The IEA estimates O&M costs for onshore pipelines to be about 2% of investment cost. Maintenance 
costs for compressor stations run at a relatively high load factor are estimated to be 3-6% of investment 
costs.
14 Historically the delivery component of tariffs was greater then the variable cost component to induce 
pipelines to sell all their capacity. With the development of secondary markets that is no longer necessary 
and tariffs increasingly reflect cost as argued by Alger and Toman (1990).
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year basis potentially cause problems for efficiency measurement results. First, as the 
frontier is calculated using two years only, DEA based MPI are influenced by stochastic 
factors.15 Secondly, a decrease in volume might be interpreted as technical regress. 
Although our cross-section is much larger then the one used by Nghiem and Coelli 
(2002) we do observe some technical regress when including delivery volume.
Next, we turn to our input measure. Here unlike most of the literature we use total cost 
as done by, for instance, Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) and Edvardsen et al. (2006). The 
latter however uses a Malmquist cost index including input quantities and prices. Also, 
Rouse and Swales (2006) describe how total expenditure is used as an input into DEA 
for the pricing of health services in New Zealand. In their case output which is typically 
measured in number of discharges is cost-weighted to account for the difficulty of 
different treatments. This illustrates the desirable property of total cost as an input: the 
proper economic weighting of all inputs. 
This choice of input changes the interpretation of our results as compared to standard 
measures of technical efficiency. Following Maniadakis and Thanassoulis (2004) our 
measure might be referred to as cost technical efficiency as it implicitly includes 
allocative efficiency. As we do not have unit prices we cannot distinguish between 
technical and allocative efficiency as done by Maniadakis and Thanassoulis (2004) who 
constructed a new Malmquist index that allows for the inclusion of prices.16 Though one 
might expect similar input prices across the US (except for labour) the International 
Energy Agency (1994, Fig. 1 Chapter 3) shows that for construction projects in 1990/91 
costs differed for a given pipeline diameter. Sickles and Streitwieser (1991) calculate 
input prices from revenue and physical quantities. This has the problem that higher 
margins translate into higher input prices. And in particular with recent increases in rate 
flexibility it is likely that margins differ across firms.
                                               
15 An alternative would be do estimate MPI using Stochastic Frontier Analysis where the frontier is based 
on the entire sample and year-to-year fluctuations effect the technical efficiency change component rather 
then the technical change component as explained by Coelli et al. (2005, p. 306).
16 Traditionally prices could not be included in Malmquist indices and one would have to resort to 
parametric techniques to account for prices in productivity measurement as done for instance by Farsi and 
Filippini (2004).
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The main advantage of a single monetary input measure from a regulator’s point of 
view is that correct physical measures are difficult to obtain due to outsourcing, quality 
differences, or simple non-reporting. Also, as mentioned by Jamasb and Pollitt (2003)
our input measure accounts implicitly for all possible trade-offs between the various 
inputs. Last, consumers (and therefore hopefully the regulator as well) are interested not 
in technical efficiency as such but the cost of the service. In this light we also use an 
alternative input measure: total revenue.
When contrasting our results for Totex and revenue models below it is important to 
keep in mind that the difference between revenue and total cost is obviously profit or 
excess return on capital. Also revenue is likely to be more volatile. Generally, revenue 
has two advantages. The first is that total cost, like physical inputs might be difficult to 
measure and thus revenue can be taken as a proxy. Second, in regulatory practice 
throughout Europe the rate-of-return is set in lengthy procedures reminiscent of US 
rate-cases. And like in the US often returns seem to be set rather arbitrarily.17 To some 
extend this practice defeats the purpose of incentive regulation by introducing a cost-
plus element. Therefore, benchmarking revenue implies that companies are free in 
setting their returns but at the same time are constraint by best practice. Thus, given the 
necessary standardization revenue is a very effective and efficient measure from a 
regulator’s perspective. Note that though revenue caps are used by many regulators we 
are not aware of an example where the revenue is not build bottom-up (like our Totex 
variable). What we suggest is rather similar to the companies “bidding” a total revenue 
number without any discussion or scrutiny of its composition.
Last, we do not include any non-discretionary variables in our analysis but suggest 
considering the following issues. First, as mentioned above the way the systems cope 
with peaks might differ and not be at the discretion of management.  Possible other non-
discretionary variables might be the end-use of deliveries (heating vs. industrial) and 
layout (trunk-line vs. radial grid). Table 2 summarizes the variables and methods used 
by several studies on productivity and efficiency of the US gas transmission industry.
                                               
17 Joskow (1972) illustrates how rates are set in the US. He observes that (not unlike in Europe) there are 
complex rules on how the rate base is set but little formal guidance is given for actual rates. Also unlike 
the other items that make up total cost, cost of capital is unobserved.
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Table 2: Summary of the Literature
Author Data Inputs Outputs Method
Callen (1978) 28 US inter-state 
gas transmission 
companies in 1965
horsepower
weight of 
pipeline steel
delivery volume Econometri
c 
production 
function
Aivazian 
(1987)
14 US inter-state 
gas transmission 
companies in 1953-
1979
horsepower
weight of 
pipeline steel
compressor fuel
labour
delivery volume 
multiplied by 
length of delivery
Econometri
c 
production 
function
Sickles and 
Streitwieser 
(1991)
14 US inter-state 
pipeline companies 
in 1977-1985
horsepower
weight of 
pipeline steel
compressor fuel
labour
delivery volume 
multiplied by 
length of delivery
DEA, SFA
Ellig (1993) 50 Texan gas 
transmission 
companies, 1989
sales 
(commercial, 
industrial, resale)
third-party 
delivery volume
total throughput
length of pipes
gas purchasing 
cost
O&M expense Econometri
c cost 
function
Granderson 
(2000)
20 US inter-state 
pipeline companies 
in 1977-1987
horsepower
weight of 
pipeline steel
compressor fuel
labour
compressor fuel SFA
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Again, in a regulatory context it is important to keep in mind that a certain choice of 
variables produces a specific set of incentives for companies that are regulated with the 
help of that particular model.18 Table 3 summarizes our models. The next section gives 
the data sources and the variable measurements.
Table 3: Models and Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Input Totex Revenue Totex Revenue
Delivery Delivery
Compressor 
capacity
Compressor 
capacity
Compressor 
capacity
Compressor 
capacity
Outputs
Network length Network length Network length Network length
5. Data and Measurement
The data is taken from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that 
requires all inter-state transmission companies above a certain size to file a yearly 
regulatory report containing both financial and operating data (FERC Form 2). As far as 
possible all data is confined to the transmission function.
Though the data is not explicitly gathered for efficiency and productivity purposes the 
large numbers of studies (previously referred to) that rely on it testify to its general 
adequacy. However, several missing values had to be estimated from adjacent periods 
as MPI do not tolerate any missing values. Also some observations where the data does 
                                               
18 Moreover, firms might learn how to game that model as shown by Jamasb et al. (2003).
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not appear to be correct were excluded and several obvious errors corrected. The data 
was corrected for inflation during the sample period. All monetary values are in 2004 
US dollars. Revenue was adjusted such that no company had a rate-of-return lower then 
6% in any year. This adjustment was made to prevent frontier firms from being those 
with sub-normal rates of return. Though, essentially six percent is an arbitrary choice, it 
is chosen to be slightly higher then US interest rates (i.e. the risk free opportunity cost). 
The adjustment was necessary for five observations. The detailed definitions of the 
various variables and their measurements are given in Table 4.
Table 4: Variable Description
Variable Name Description Measurement
Totex O&M  (less fuel, including labour) + 
Deprecation + Cost of Capital (written-
down value multiplied by 6 percent)
2004 $
Revenue Revenue from transportation of gas of 
others through transmission pipes. 
2004 $
Delivery Yearly total of gas transmitted for others 
(excluding losses).
Dth (decatherm)19
Mains Total length of pipes (mains) Miles
Horsepower (HP) Total horsepower rating at compressor 
stations
HP
Age Accumulated deprecation at mid-year /
Annual depreciation
Years
Load factor Delivery/Capacity (max. past single-day 
peak*365)
%
Rate of return 
(ROR)
(Revenue – O&M – Dep.)/Average 
written-down value
%
                                               
19 1 therm is equal to 100000 British thermal units (BTU).
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Note that we exclude the cost of fuel as it is our understanding that most pipelines 
withhold fixed percentages of the gas actually delivered as a compensation for 
compressor fuel usage.20 Also, we use historic book value as our cost measure which is 
open to criticism. But Edvardsen et al. (2006) note that historic book value is a 
reasonable measure as we analyze “efficiency improvement and not static individual 
scores”.
Summary statistics are given in Table 5. It is evident that the size of the companies 
included varies greatly. In terms of pipeline length the biggest company is about sixty 
times larger then the smallest company. This reflects the fact that the nature of the 
companies differs. Whereas some connect several other pipelines in a particular region 
to benefit from arbitrage, others deliver gas over long distances from the main 
production regions in Canada and the Gulf of Mexico. For this reason the two largest 
hub operators were excluded as their delivery to cost ratios are by far the largest.
Table 5: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Obs.: 351, Years: 1996-2004, Firms: 39
Totex (m$.) 137 112 7.88 540
Revenue (m$.) 263 223 14.2 1100
Delivery (Dth.) 715 589 59 2840
Mains (miles) 4,645 4,117 269 16,666
Horsepower (HP) 395,553 399,938 5,200.00 1,600,000
Age (years) 27 31 4 508
Load factor (%) 0.67 0.19 0.25 1.15
ROR (%) 0.26 0.12 0.04 0.98
                                               
20 This assumption is based on private communication with two companies whose data we include.
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Also note that the last three variables Age, Load factor, and ROR (before adjustment) 
are not included in our analysis but help to describe the sample. For instance the 
average age is 27 years which is three times our sample length.21 As discussed below 
this discrepancy is likely to weaken some of our results.
Figure 3 gives the changes in the yearly sample totals for the variables that are included 
in the calculation of the MPI. When looking at the output variables we observe that 
delivery volume fluctuates on a yearly basis whereas total length of pipelines stays 
virtually constant and total horsepower is continuously increasing.
What is interesting is that while capacity is added total cost and revenue are falling. 
This might be explained by either pipelines expecting demand to pick up, pipelines 
taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities, or returns or other costs have been falling.
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Figure 3: Changes in Inputs and Outputs (1996=100)
                                               
21 The unrealistic measure for maximum age should be due to measurement error or particular accounting 
practices.
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6. Results
Table 6 gives the regression results of the cost driver analysis. As already discussed 
above there are arguments to believe that total cost does not vary with delivery once we 
account for capacity. Our results below seem to confirm this. However the coefficient 
for delivery is larger (and the coefficient for mains smaller) in the revenue model,
possible reflecting that tariffs are not entirely cost-reflective in their decomposition.
Table 6: Cost Driver Test Results
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent variable ln(Totex) ln(Revenue)
ln(Delivery) 0.267 0.482
(0.810) (0.642)
ln(HP) -0.529** -0.508*
(0.201) (0.248)
ln(Mains) 1.558*** 0.842*
(0.343) (0.342)
ln(Delivery)^2 0.003 0.000
(0.020) (0.016)
ln(HP)^2 0.032*** 0.031**
(0.009) (0.011)
ln(Mains)^2 -0.086*** -0.042
(0.022) (0.022)
Year -0.016*** -0.025***
(0.003) (0.003)
CONSTANT 39.607*** 56.250***
(10.250) (8.105)
LL 327.72 279.64
AIC -639.43 -543.29
obs. 351 351
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
23
We started with a full Translog but dropped the interaction terms which are not 
individually significant (possibly due to multi-collinearity). Also, the model reported is 
the same as the full Translog according to a log-likelihood test. However, even though 
the two coefficients for Delivery are individually insignificant a log-likelihood test does 
not suggest that we can drop them. Thus, the empirical evidence on delivery volume as 
a cost driver is not conclusive. Also, we added a trend whose coefficient confirms that 
costs (and revenue) are falling over the sample period. Last, it is important to stress that 
these particular results are likely to be influenced by the actual tariff regime in place 
(especially for revenue). The results might be different for a different period or a 
different country.
Now we turn to our main results, the Malmquist productivity indices. Table 7 and Table 
8 show the cumulative (and averaged across firms) Malmquist indices (TFPC) and their 
decomposition into technical efficiency change (TEC) and technical change (TC).
Additionally, the yearly technical efficiency scores (TE) which are inputs to the 
Malmquist indices are reported. The last row in both tables gives the implied average 
yearly growth rates by taking the index for the last year (2004) and dividing it by the 
number of years in the sample. Table 7 gives the results for the two Totex models.
Table 7: Average Malmquist Indices and their Decomposition
Model 1 (Totex, incl. delivery) Model 3 (Totex, excl. delivery)
Year TE TFPC TEC TC TE TFPC TEC TC
1996 0.52 1 1 1 0.45 1 1 1
1997 0.58 1.07 1.13 0.95 0.49 1.14 1.12 1.02
1998 0.61 1.09 1.22 0.91 0.50 1.21 1.18 1.03
1999 0.65 1.12 1.33 0.86 0.50 1.22 1.18 1.05
2000 0.63 1.17 1.30 0.91 0.49 1.25 1.20 1.06
2001 0.61 1.17 1.24 0.95 0.51 1.30 1.26 1.05
2002 0.64 1.25 1.33 0.96 0.52 1.44 1.32 1.11
2003 0.63 1.20 1.32 0.91 0.54 1.42 1.40 1.02
2004 0.64 1.23 1.28 0.96 0.53 1.47 1.41 1.06
growth rate 
p.a. (%)
- 2.9 3.5 -0.5 - 5.9 5 0.8
24
First, we observe that the MPI and its components have larger values when delivery is 
excluded. This is not surprising as length of mains and horsepower (unlike delivery) are 
virtually non-decreasing. The technical regress for Model 1 might be caused by the 
fluctuations in delivery as explained above. However, for the static technical efficiency 
scores the numbers for Model 1 are higher as the additional variable allows more firms 
to be relatively efficient.
Table 8 gives the same results for the two revenue models. Here TFP growth is stronger 
because revenue falls more quickly then Totex as shown in Figure 3 above. Also, for 
almost all models TEC dominates TC. Generally, absolute numbers vary greatly across 
our four models.
Table 8: Average Malmquist Indices and their Decomposition
Model 2 (Revenue, incl. delivery) Model 4 (Revenue, excl. delivery)
Year TE TFPC TEC TC TE TFPC TEC TC
1996 0.53 1 1 1 0.44 1 1 1
1997 0.54 1.09 1.04 1.05 0.48 1.18 1.11 1.06
1998 0.59 1.18 1.17 1.01 0.55 1.27 1.34 0.95
1999 0.60 1.20 1.20 1.00 0.54 1.29 1.32 0.98
2000 0.65 1.26 1.32 0.95 0.57 1.33 1.38 0.96
2001 0.60 1.26 1.20 1.05 0.54 1.37 1.32 1.06
2002 0.61 1.31 1.25 1.05 0.55 1.46 1.38 1.07
2003 0.57 1.35 1.16 1.17 0.54 1.52 1.36 1.12
2004 0.56 1.36 1.13 1.21 0.53 1.55 1.35 1.16
growth rate 
p.a. (%)
- 4.5 1.6 2.6 - 6.9 4.3 2
Looking at the implied yearly growth rates Model 1 for instance would produce an 
average yearly productivity increase of 2.9 percent. These growth rates are higher then 
in earlier periods as reported by Sickles and Streitwieser (1991) and Granderson (2000). 
Also, as an example for a US-EU comparison this number might be contrasted with the 
result of a recent report by the German network regulator [Bundesnetzagentur (2006a)] 
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which found an average yearly TFP growth of 2.19 percent for the entire energy 
industry for the years 1977-1997 (using a Törnquist index). However, both the different 
methodologies used by these authors and the different market environment at the time 
make comparisons difficult. Next, the same numbers are presented graphically. When 
looking at the results across time they appear to be more similar across models. Figure 4
shows Malmquist indices and their decomposition into technical efficiency change and 
technical change for the Totex models. Whereas the upper panel includes delivery the 
lower panel excludes delivery as an output.
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Figure 4: Average Malmquist Indices and their Decomposition
Figure 5 shows a similar pattern for the revenue models. In the second half of the 
sample period technical efficiency change is falling whereas technical change is much 
stronger than for the Totex models. While we do not have a good explanation for this 
we notice that a merger wave in gas distribution and transmission occurred around the 
year 2000 as shown by Moss (2005). Increasing market power would also explain the 
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discrepancy between the path of the Totex and Revenue based technical efficiency 
changes.22
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Figure 5: Average Malmquist Indices and Their Decomposition
Table 9 and Table 10 give the Pearson correlation coefficients for the results from the 
various models. In particular, we are interested in the correlation between the Revenue 
and Totex models where the results are highlighted along the diagonal in the lower left 
parts of the two tables.
When focusing on these diagonals two observations can be made. First, the correlation 
is higher for the level TE scores as compared to the various change measures. Second, 
the correlations are higher for the models excluding delivery in Table 10. This seems to 
relate to the presence of volume related charges that effect revenue more than total cost. 
                                               
22 In the US like in Europe mergers are decided by the antitrust authorities and not the regulators. In the 
US the former use a less stringent "no harm" benchmark as discussed by Balto and Mongoven (2001).
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Thus, when delivery is excluded the remaining explanatory variables (horsepower and 
length of mains) have the same relative effect on Totex and Revenue which leads to 
higher correlations.
Table 9: Pearson Correlation Coefficients, Models including Delivery
Model 1 (Totex) Model 2 (Revenue)
TE TFPC TEC TC TE TFPC TEC TC
TE 1.000
TFPC -0.134 1.000
TEC -0.166 0.729 1.000
M
od
el
 1
TC 0.003 0.403 -0.310 1.00
TE 0.849 -0.130 -0.082 -0.090 1.000
TFPC -0.241 0.589 0.414 0.376 -0.037 1.000
TEC -0.301 0.395 0.428 -0.011 0.049 0.858 1.000
M
od
el
 2
TC 0.031 0.293 0.013 0.546 -0.166 0.329 -0.180 1.000
Table 10: Pearson Correlation Coefficients, Models excluding Delivery
Model 3 (Totex) Model 4 (Revenue)
TE TFPC TEC TC TE TFPC TEC TC
TE 1.000
TFPC -0.215 1.000
TEC -0.267 0.886 1.000
M
od
el
 3
TC 0.071 0.262 -0.194 1.000
TE 0.876 -0.167 -0.199 0.071 1.000
TFPC -0.230 0.804 0.682 0.289 -0.091 1.000
TEC -0.278 0.683 0.748 -0.103 -0.084 0.890 1.000
M
od
el
 4
TC 0.069 0.238 -0.143 0.848 0.005 0.280 -0.169 1.000
Next, we turn to the results for the convergence tests, looking at β-convergence first. 
Figure 6 plots the DEA technical efficiency score in the base year against the technical 
efficiency change component of the MPI (for Model 1). Second, to see what the effect 
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of the sample period length is on convergence, the MPI calculations where repeated for 
all possible sample lengths moving the base year up by one each time. The different 
runs are represented by the differently shaped markers and lines.  For each value on the 
x-axis there are several values along the y-axis. These are the values for a given firm 
across the years. The fitted lines show that the rate of technical efficiency change tends 
to be the higher the lower the level of technical efficiency in the base year. Also, this 
negative relationship weakens the shorter the sample period. Though, we provide no 
formal test the relationship between the length of the sample period and the strength β-
convergence potentially has implications for the length of the regulatory period.
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Figure 6: Technical Efficiency Change vs. Technical Efficiency
Next, we present more formal evidence on β-convergence. Following Alam and Sickles 
(2000) we regress the average year to year growth in the technical efficiency scores on 
the logarithm of the technical efficiency scores in the base year (i.e. 1996). Table 11
presents the results. The negative coefficient confirms that there is convergence in the 
efficiency scores. However, the slope coefficient for the revenue model is not 
significant. Thus, both tests indicate that there is β-convergence.
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Table 11: Results of β-Convergence Test
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent 
variable
Avg. TE growth for Totex Avg. TE growth for Revenue
ln(TE96) -0.019* -0.019
(0.009) (0.011)
CONSTANT 0.003 -0.014
(0.008) (0.010)
Prob>F 4.55 3.21
R-squared? 0.09 0.05
No. of obs. 39 39
* p<0.05
Next, we turn to our results for σ-convergence. Figure 7 gives the kernel distributions of 
the technical efficiency indices for Model 1 (results for the other models are similar but 
not shown here). We observe that both the mean and the variance increase over the 
sample period which implies that there is no σ-convergence. Thus, we do not arrive at a 
robust conclusion on convergence. Though there seems to be β-convergence we find no 
evidence of σ-convergence.
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7. Discussion and Conclusion
7.4.Discussion of Results
Since the liberalization of the well-head price for natural gas in the US and subsequent 
regulatory change for the pipeline business several studies have measured firm-level 
efficiency and productivity, and in particular the effect of regulatory change. These 
studies found that efficiency declined and convergence did not occur in the first decade 
after well-head price deregulation.  In this study, we focus on more recent years and
find modest improvements in technical efficiency (and stronger improvements in 
overall productivity). Moreover, we find some indication of convergence over time.
As to our models, we opted for a single monetary input measure (total cost or revenue)
which is not a common approach in the literature  but offers several advantages: 
standard accounting data is sufficient, trade-offs between the various inputs are 
accounted for, and monetary measures have the advantage that they account for 
outsourcing and quality differences in inputs. Also, our use of revenue as an alternative 
input has two desirable features from a regulatory perspective: revenue is the total cost 
to consumers and aggregate revenue measures are readily available. As we use a 
monetary input measure but do not include prices (and thus do not distinguish between 
technical and allocative efficiency) our efficiency measures have incentive properties 
different from standard technical efficiency measures. Our measure would have the 
same incentive properties as a standard technical efficiency measure if firms were 
allocatively efficient and faced the same input prices. The results for Totex and revenue 
are similar but there are differences. This is not surprising as there are many reasons 
why revenue might deviate from Totex tough as shown above they track each other in 
the aggregate for our US sample.
On the output side, we examined models which exclude gas delivery volumes because 
the literature on costs and our understanding of tariff setting indicate that both are 
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largely driven by capacity rather then volume. Our efforts to confirm this empirically  
are not conclusive and the productivity results differ depending on whether delivery is 
included as an output or not.
We report both DEA based technical efficiency scores and Malmquist productivity 
indices. Though most regulators rely on cross-section based static scores23 it might be 
interesting to contrast these with observed productivity changes. We observe that a 
particular change in the model can lead to different reaction by the two techniques.
As to our results TFP change and TEC seem higher than one would expect for a rate-of-
return regulated, natural monopoly industry. For our two Totex models we observe 
yearly average growth rates of 2.9 and 5.9 percent. For our revenue models it is 4.5 and 
6.9 percent respectively. For all models except Model 2 TEC dominates TC. For all 
models TFPC is upward trending over the entire sample period. For all models except 
Model 3 TEC is flattening or declining from the year 2000 onwards. Though we have 
no good explanation for this it might be related to merger activity as discussed above.
Next, we observe some convergence in relative performance. Whereas firms starting at 
a lower efficiency level grow faster (β-convergence) we do not observe that the 
dispersion of growth rates (σ-convergence) declines. But even this partial evidence for 
convergence is telling since in theory rate-of-return regulation unlike competition exerts 
no pressure to converge. One reason why we only observe limited evidence for 
convergence might be our relatively short sample length. In order to come to stronger 
conclusions on converge a sample length equivalent to the investment cycle would be 
necessary. Also, our results are averages and therefore are likely to gloss over regional 
differences. As we know that pipeline competition is foremost a regional phenomenon 
so would be convergence.
                                               
23 It is interesting that Ofwat the UK water regulator performs its benchmark on a cross-section even 
though it has a panel at its disposal [see Weeks and Lay (2006)]. At a presentation of their draft the 
authors commented that a possible reason for the continued use of a cross-section is that management 
does not consider itself responsible for the performance of past management teams.
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Thus, our results show that regulatory change in the US is accompanied by “cost 
productivity” and “revenue productivity” improvements. What changed is not so much 
the actual rate-of-return regulation but the building of competitive markets and 
increased tariff flexibility (which can be obtained even under an unchanged rate-of-
return regulation). Encouraging competition through the creation of the necessary 
institutions might be more important in the long-run than the prevailing form of tariff 
regulation. Also, increasing competition might explain why we observe that in a mature 
industry, with a long history of rate-of-return regulation, technical efficiency change 
dominates technical change.
7.5.Lessons for Europe
Many European countries recently embarked on a route of regulatory change heading 
towards incentive regulation. It might be worthwhile for European regulators to see 
what insights US experience and data offer.
First, our work points towards issues for data collection. Though, FERC data collection 
is driven by the needs of elaborate rate-cases its overall requirements on transparency 
and rigour in data collection are an important point of reference. However, FERC 
recognizes that a move away from rate-of-return regulation shifts the emphasis from 
quantity to quality for data collection [see O'Neill et al. (1996)]. Our discussion on 
variable choice above also highlighted that attention should be paid to the proper 
delineation of the business function that is to be benchmarked. Setting functional 
boundaries is important for comparability but also determines the incentives the 
regulator sets.
Broadly speaking, our analysis points towards a short-run and a long-run use of US 
data. In the short-run European regulators can benchmark individual companies without 
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there being a standardized European data set. In the long-run European regulators could 
assess the overall performance of the European industry against the US industry.
Obviously, the latter would also give an indication of European regulators relative 
performance vis-à-vis the US regulator.
As to benchmarking individual European companies we remark the following. Though, 
we do not address comparability in detail we believe (and other regulators have 
shown24) that a sufficient degree of comparability can be obtained with FERC data. We 
would like to make two general points here. First, once European regulators begin to 
collaborate on gathering data in a systematic and comparable way there would be 
enough data to produce robust results from European data only. However, in the 
meantime comparing European companies to US companies might provide at least 
some guidance for regulators that often face difficult-to-verify claims from industry. An 
added advantage of US data is that today a panel is available that allows for more robust 
conclusions on performance changes simply because single cross-sections are likely to 
be affected by measurement error. In the long-run, even if sufficient European data was
available international benchmarks still have an important role to play. It is possible that 
US companies embody world best practice. Also, there is no reason to believe that firms 
under incentive regulation should fare worse then under rate-of-return regulation 
(complemented by competition or not). To exclude superior management performance 
from any benchmark would amount to deliberately forfeiting consumer surplus. 
Therefore, how the US industry performs might set a benchmark for the results from 
European incentive regulation. Especially as the US strife for market integration and 
competition might leap-frog European efforts to outperform rate-of-return regulation by 
adopting benchmark-based incentive regulation.
                                               
24 In particular regulators in New Zealand and Australia have been keen users of US data to benchmark 
their regulated companies. See, for instance, IPART (1999), Pacific Economics Group (2004), and 
Carrington (2002).
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